AN UPHILL STRUGGLE

AN UPHILL STRUGGLE
The present situation in Iran is a period of political and social upheaval and radical change which is unprecedented in the history of the Islamic regime. This movement might not be succeeding this time but it is certainly changing the equilibrium of forces on the top of the hierarchy of the regime. During the last fortnight, the regime managed to alienate some of the most influential people in the core of system. Interestingly, it did happen in front of the people who had been kept out of the power struggle inside the regime for 30 years. It should not be forgotten that characters like Rafsanjani, Khatami, Mir Hossein Mossavi and Karroubi, all belong to the core of the establishment. People are stunned by the scale of the disagreement across the system. This illustrates the fact that the regime is in a transitional period. The nature of the system is dramatically changing. The republic element of the regime is being ignored or even intended to be wiped off. Those people who are against this new ideology will be known as outsiders.

There are so many theories regarding what is happening inside the establishment. The most likely theory is that, the fundamentalist clerics have decided to change the nature of the regime from an Islamic republic to the extreme form of Islamic regime which gives absolute authority to the religious establishment. There might even be a life time president to run the country according to the policy dictated by the supreme leader. Even if this theory proves inaccurate or wrong, the fact that the regime does not tolerate any kind of criticism and dispute indicates the inclination toward a totalitarian regime. The initial stage of this reality has already been seen in the streets of Tehran or other major cities in Iran. The question is what should be done?

Civil disobedience

Giving the level of brutality of the security services and riot police during the last few days, it is generally accepted that people are now petrified of taking to the streets and demonstrating openly. There are, however, a few brave and very determined young people who are still willing to risk their lives and confront the ferocity of the members of the militia.

Civil disobedience is the active refusal to obey certain laws, demands and commands of a government without resorting to physical violence or even risk one’s life. This has been practised effectively in different parts of the world. In Egypt during 1919 revolution against the British occupation, in India during the campaign for independence from the British Empire, in East Germany to oust their communist dictatorships and so many other places. This technique is generally used when the ruling government shuts down all other possible and obvious routs in front of its opponents. It is interesting that people in Iran have already adopted the technique by going to rooftops and shouting slogans during the night or switching on their car’s headlights during the day. However, this kind of protest must be generalized and become widespread to be really effective.

The enormous pressure which the authorities used during the last 10 days has resulted in increasing the sense of frustration among the general public. People do not change their minds because of repression from the government; they change their strategy instead and adopt new techniques to tackle the problem. Those who were killed, injured and arrested established a milestone which signifies the paramount importance of democracy.

Political sanction

I firmly believe that western countries should send a strong signal to the authorities in Iran not only condemning the violence against its own people but also threatening to down-grade their relationship. The Iranian regime accuses the west of interfering in its affairs anyway. If all the EU countries and the United States unanimously agree to pressurize Iran, they will have the political initiative against the Iranian government. Such a united policy would strengthen the position of the government’s opponents and also highlight the lack of credibility of the regime in the eyes of the international community.

Shahin Motamedi

What is the next move?

What is the next move?

Chess is a game of position. The position of your pieces in relation to your opponent’s pieces is crucial. It is essential that these positions are constantly evaluated according to your long term tactics. Furthermore, the players need to be aware of the value of the pieces. When you make a move, you always have to consider all the possible moves that your opponent might make. If the current crisis in Iran is put in this context, one can make a better assessment of the situation.

Based on the latest statement from Mr. Mir Hossein Mossavi, the government of Mr. Ahmadinejad planned to rig the vote months before the election. If the plan is considered as the first move of this dangerous game from the side of the government, the question is whether it had been assessed properly before being implemented; even so the way the election was handled proves that the government seriously miscalculated the game right from the beginning. This is the evidence:

a) Many of the delegates of the candidates were not allowed to enter the poll centers because they had not received their ID cards from the interior ministry.
b) The existence of 14000 mobile ballot boxes which by the definition were not monitored by the delegates.
c) Although only 45 million people were eligible to vote, 59 million and 600 thousands ballot papers were printed.
d) The ballot boxes were already sealed before the arrival of candidates’ delegates early in morning of the Election Day.
e) The results were announced three hours after the closing time. This means that more than 45 million votes were counted in three hours!

The government did not consider the possible move of its opponent. Ahmadinejad and his team for the first three days simply could not believe the reaction from their rival candidates, let alone the massive number of people in the streets of the capital which clearly outnumbered the security services and riot police.

In a capricious move, the government decided to arrest many political dissidents and increase the number of the security servicemen and move some of the pawns to confront the demonstrators. These pawns are expendable and have the lowest theoretical value in this battle. The savageness and brutality of these repugnant agents of the government are beyond belief. However, the consequence of this move was more protestors in the streets and more violence.

The notorious speech from the supreme leader can be counted as the next move. It was aimed to give the full authority to the government to eradicate the demonstrators. It was a combination of threat and ultimatum. However, the day he made that speech it was the day he entered the fray on the side of Ahmadinejad, obviously not a very good move after all. In the final move the government decided to put the blame on foreign countries, in particular the UK. This move by its very nature is a desperate one, unfounded and preposterous.

For the regime in Iran the stake could not be higher and the possibility of the checkmate is on the horizon.

Shahin M

IRON FIST

IRON FIST



In colloquial English, an "Iron Fist" refers to the authority exerted by a powerful, unforgiving governing figure. The supreme leader of Iran today fiercely warned and criticized those people who lead, participate, and even support the recent demonstrations against the result of the last week presidential election. Although he tried to reconcile the key figures of the dispute, he particularly said the opposition leaders would be held responsible if there was any further violence in the street. He gave full support to Mr. Ahmadi nejad and praised him for his service during the last four years. He threatened if the demonstrators did not leave the streets there would be very serious consequences.

This confrontational pattern of behavior is not unprecedented from the authorities of Iran. However, none of the political analysts expected such a harsh response from the spiritual leader of Iran. They did however predict he would support ahmadi nejad and call for calm until the Council of Guardians had investigated the complaints. The speech even by the regime’s standards was the most aggressive reaction anyone could have expected.

The reason behind such a reaction is that the supreme leader understands the real threat which has shaken the foundation of the regime; the recent events in Iran remind everyone including Ayatollah Ali Khamenei of the initial stages of the Islamic Revolution 30 years ago. He knows the rifts and divisions in the heart of the establishment compound the crisis. Therefore, there was a crucial need for him as the supreme leader to send a blunt and uncompromising message.

In fact, he said everything he could have said to draw a line and start a new chapter. He of course blamed the foreign powers for interfering and made the link between the enemies and lawbreakers. He has thrown the ball into the court of oppositions. Now it is their turn and particularly their leaders to either back down or stand up and continue to protest. In the light of this speech, the latter would result in a massive crack-down from the side of the regime. However, if they decide to call the demonstrations off, they would certainly damage their own reputation and bring huge disappointment among their supporters.

The “Iron Fist” is revealed; the velvet glove is off. The speech is a double edged- sword. Although it has terrifying potential for those who are still dissatisfied and feel betrayed with the outcome of the election, it can aggravate the situation and actually widen the gap inside the governing body of the regime.




The search of the Iranian people for justice and freedom continues.

Shahin M

Crisis mangement

Crisis management

Crisis management by the definition is the process by which a system deals with any major unpredictable event that threatens to harm the system. Three elements are common to most definitions of crisis: (a) a threat to the organization, (b) the element of surprise, and (c) a short decision time. Crisis in Iran is not an exception from the above elements.

a) It certainly imposes serious threats against the core of the regime. It has effectively undermined the credibility and the virtue of the republic of the system. Outside of Iran it has damaged the reputation of the Islamic republic of Iran, particularly among Islamic nations.

b) The regime might have expected some opposition after of the announcement of the results. However, it was certainly surprised by the scale of the demonstration.

c) This is the most important element in this crisis like any other crisis. For many years the regime tried to manage the effect of information technology inside Iran. All the internet service providers are registered by the government. The mobile network companies are either totally or partially governmental therefore the government has direct influence on how and when they operate. The government is effectively equipped to jam the satellite waves and prevent the general public from listening to the outside radio and watching the satellite television. Having said that, the Iranian government did not pace itself with the advances in information technology. For the very reason and despite the latest decision about banding the foreign reporters from the streets of Tehran, there are still influx of information from inside of Iran including video footages, pictures and the news updates. In fact this way of communication has hindered the efforts of the ruling system to control the situation on the ground. Modern technology has not only strengthened the element of surprise but also has shortened the decision time for the security services to deal with demonstrations at the different part of a mega city like Tehran.


The government of Iran has its own strategy to solve this problem

Ι. Crisis, what crisis? Mr. Ahamadi nejad during his first press conference after the announcement of the results tried to scale down the severity of the problem. He compared his political opponents to the losers of a football match but also accused them of passing the red light so deserving to be arrested. We should not make the mistake of thinking this is a denial of the reality of the situation but is rather a conning strategy to attempt to manage the crisis.

ΙΙ. Smear campaign: The state television fed the general public with reports about the hooligans who vandalized banks, cars and public properties. It therefore minimized the amount of support the demonstrators had.

ΙΙΙ. Carrot & stick: From one hand the supreme leader and the guardian council offered limited compromises regarding recount of the votes and dealing with opponents' complaints, on the other hand the riot police and militia groups stormed the dormitories, university campuses and charged the demonstrators with ferocity and brutality. At the same time the supreme leader asked the demonstrators to calm down and let the guardian council deal with the problem in a peaceful atmosphere.


So far the crowd in the streets of Tehran and other major cities across the country emboldened by their million-strong march on Monday demonstrate their total refusal to accept any compromise. It is crucially important to be aware of the strategic retreat by the government in the coming days which is to calm the situation first and then clamp down on the opposition completely.

Shahin M

ROAD MAP FOR A NEW DAWN ?

ROAD MAP FOR A NEW DAWN ?



In 640 when the Arabs invaded Iran and conquered the Persian Empire they announced their triumph as their greatest victory (Fath al Fotoh). They were confronted by a resilient nation unlike any they had fought before. Although the Arab victory brought to an ignominious end to Sāsānids, ruling density at the time, it was not the end of the Persian Empire. Rather, it marked a new beginning. Within two centuries Iranian civilization was revived with a cultural richness developing new ideology and taking in art, architecture and crafts. This great level of sophistication was rooted in its pre-Islamic Iranian heritage but was stirred into fresh life by the Arab Muslim conquest.

I emphatically disagree with those who state that the Iranian people always know what they do not want but hardly know what they want. History proves them wrong. Even our ancestors always defended their sovereignty and freedom. The Iranian people have always struggled for their right to be free but particularly during the last 200 years. The vast majority of them might not be able to define precisely this sacred longing, however they can sense it; for them it is like the scent of jasmines in the spring or watching doves flying free in the blue sky.

Why has this deep desire of the Iranian people still not been fulfilled? The answer is simple. Those who have been in charge of our affairs, so called politician, have always put their own best interest before the best interest of our nation. The deals have been done behind closed doors; the majority of ordinary people have been treated as second class citizens who did not understand the well-being of the country. The politicians believed the nation needed an emperor, a guardian or a wise supreme leader.

The recent events in Iran and particularly in the capital no matter how sad and upsetting they are, have created a vestige of hope for the Iranian people inside and outside of Iran. However, it can not be overstressed that this time the problem must not be dealt with by replacing one president with another or even one supreme leader with another. The concept of having reform inside the regime was tested during Khatami’s presidency. It took eight long years for people to understand that the power structure of the system would never allow any real change. They would certainly not allow simple rights like freedom of speech and freedom of expression. Is there any evidence which makes the situation different this time?

I firmly believe that our beloved nation will eventually prevail and receive the precious gift of God who offers justice and mercy to every single human being. This is our absolute duty as Iranians to honour those people who are being humiliated, attacked and killed on the streets of our country. We must fight as we have never fought before and I know that we will not go quietly into the night.

Shahin M

Rafsanjani:shark or kingmaker?

Rafsanjani: shark or kingmaker?
The former president remains unpopular with many Iranians, but he may yet be able to force a re-run of Friday's disputed poll

The man accused by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of masterminding the opposition campaign to oust him from the presidency has dropped out of view since election day. But Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani remains a formidable figure in Iranian politics with a network of well-placed allies straddling the reformist and moderate conservative camps. If any one leader is able to force a re-run of last Friday's disputed poll, it may be the two-term former president nicknamed the "shark".
Rafsanjani was last heard from in public as he cast his vote on Friday. According to the Iranian Students News Agency, he called for a "clean" poll and said a big turnout (favouring the reformists) would boost Iran's regional and international image. Following the ensuing storm over Ahmadinejad's apparent victory, al-Arabiya television reported Rafsanjani had resigned as chairman of the Assembly of Experts and of the Expediency Council, two key government bodies. This report remains unconfirmed.
More intriguing are similarly unsubstantiated claims that Rafsanjani is in the holy city of Qom, where he once studied and where he has strong links to a moderate clerical body, the Association of Combatant Clergy. Rafsanjani was said to be assessing whether he has sufficient votes in the 86-member Assembly of Experts to dismiss Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader and Ahmadinejad's chief patron. Under Iran's constitution, only the assembly has the power to do this.
The super-rich Rafsanjani, his family, and his supporters in the reformist Kargozaran party make no bones about helping finance and direct Mir Hossein Mousavi's campaign to topple Ahmadinejad, whom they despise. But with Mousavi ostensibly beaten, the developing post-election struggle now pits Rafsanjani against Khamenei rather than the president – who is widely seen as a mouthpiece for the hardline fundamentalism typified by the Supreme Leader. Although he is supposed to stay above the fray, Khamenei endorsed Ahmadinejad this time, just as in the second round of the 2005 election.
Rafsanjani has made no secret of his belief that foreign and economic policies pursued during the past four years under Khamenei's guidance have seriously damaged the Islamic Republic. His frustrations came to a head last week after Ahmadinejad was allowed to publicly accuse him of corruption. In an angry letter he lambasted Khamenei for failing to uphold the country's dignity. In what was in effect an unprecedented challenge to Khamenei's authority, he implied the Supreme Leader, normally above criticism, was negligent, partial, and possibly involved in plans to steal the election.
"I am expecting you to resolve this position in order to extinguish the fire, whose smoke can be seen in the atmosphere, and to foil dangerous plots," Rafsanjani wrote. "If the system cannot or does not want to confront such ugly and sin-infected phenomena as insults, lies and false allegations, how can we consider ourselves followers of the sacred Islamic system?"
Rafsanjani remains unpopular with many Iranians who believe the corruption claims and blame him for a murderous, covert campaign to silence dissidents at home and abroad during his 1989-97 presidency. Those latter allegations earned him another nickname: the "grey eminence". At the same time he is respected as one of the Islamic revolution's founding fathers and a close associate of its first leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. As a result he can count on some powerful friends if he decides to try to shame Khamenei into allowing an election re-run or standing down.
Apart from his clerical allies in Qom, prominent establishment conservatives such as Ali Akbar Velayati and Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri have criticised Ahmadinejad. So, too, has Ali Larijani, the influential Majlis (parliament) speaker and former national security chief. The mayor of Tehran, Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, is another potential ally, as are the former president Mohammad Khatami, Mousavi, the other defeated presidential candidates, and their millions of thwarted supporters.
If mobilised, his would comprise an elite coalition operating inside the hierarchy of the Islamic Republic, rather than from outside on the streets. It would not be a democratic movement; but it would be a dagger held to Khamenei's breast. Not for nothing is the Machiavellian Rafsanjani, pistachio nut millionaire, pragmatist and ruthless political survivor, known by yet another nickname: the "kingmaker". Iran awaits his next move.

Simon Tisdall
guardian.co.uk, Monday 15 June 2009 17.30 BST

Iran's political coup

Iran's political coup

If the reports coming out of Tehran about an electoral coup are sustained, then Iran has entered an entirely new phase of its post-revolution history. One characteristic that has always distinguished Iran from the crude dictators in much of the rest of the Middle East was its respect for the voice of the people, even when that voice was saying things that much of the leadership did not want to hear.
In 1997, Iran’s hard line leadership was stunned by the landslide election of Mohammed Khatami, a reformer who promised to bring rule of law and a more human face to the harsh visage of the Iranian revolution. It took the authorities almost a year to recover their composure and to reassert their control through naked force and cynical manipulation of the constitution and legal system. The authorities did not, however, falsify the election results and even permitted a resounding reelection four years later. Instead, they preferred to prevent the president from implementing his reform program.
In 2005, when it appeared that no hard line conservative might survive the first round of the presidential election, there were credible reports of ballot manipulation to insure that Mr Ahmadinejad could run (and win) against former president Rafsanjani in the second round. The lesson seemed to be that the authorities might shift the results in a close election but they would not reverse a landslide vote.
The current election appears to repudiate both of those rules. The authorities were faced with a credible challenger, Mir Hossein Mousavi, who had the potential to challenge the existing power structure on certain key issues. He ran a surprisingly effective campaign, and his “green wave” began to be seen as more than a wave. In fact, many began calling it a Green Revolution. For a regime that has been terrified about the possibility of a “velvet revolution,” this may have been too much.
On the basis of what we know so far, here is the sequence of events starting on the afternoon of election day, Friday, June 12.
· Near closing time of the polls, mobile text messaging was turned off nationwide
· Security forces poured out into the streets in large numbers
· The Ministry of Interior (election headquarters) was surrounded by concrete barriers and armed men
· National television began broadcasting pre-recorded messages calling for everyone to unite behind the winner
· The Mousavi campaign was informed officially that they had won the election, which perhaps served to temporarily lull them into complacency
· But then the Ministry of Interior announced a landslide victory for Ahmadinejad
· Unlike previous elections, there was no breakdown of the vote by province, which would have provided a way of judging its credibility
· The voting patterns announced by the government were identical in all parts of the country, an impossibility (also see the comments of Juan Cole at the title link)
· Less than 24 hours later, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamene`i publicly announced his congratulations to the winner, apparently confirming that the process was complete and irrevocable, contrary to constitutional requirements
· Shortly thereafter, all mobile phones, Facebook, and other social networks were blocked, as well as major foreign news sources.
All of this had the appearance of a well orchestrated strike intended to take its opponents by surprise – the classic definition of a coup. Curiously, this was not a coup of an outside group against the ruling elite; it was a coup of the ruling elite against its own people.
It is still too early for anything like a comprehensive analysis of implications, but here are some initial thoughts:
1. The willingness of the regime simply to ignore reality and fabricate election results without the slightest effort to conceal the fraud represents a historic shift in Iran’s Islamic revolution. All previous leaders at least paid lip service to the voice of the Iranian people. This suggests that Iran’s leaders are aware of the fact that they have lost credibility in the eyes of many (most?) of their countrymen, so they are dispensing with even the pretense of popular legitimacy in favor of raw power.
2. The Iranian opposition, which includes some very powerful individuals and institutions, has an agonizing decision to make. If they are intimidated and silenced by the show of force (as they have been in the past), they will lose all credibility in the future with even their most devoted followers. But if they choose to confront their ruthless colleagues forcefully, not only is it likely to be messy but it could risk running out of control and potentially bring down the entire existing power structure, of which they are participants and beneficiaries.
3. With regard to the United States and the West, nothing would prevent them in principle from dealing with an illegitimate authoritarian government. We do it every day, and have done so for years (the Soviet Union comes to mind). But this election is an extraordinary gift to those who have been most skeptical about President Obama’s plan to conduct negotiations with Iran. Former Bush official Elliott Abrams was quick off the mark, commenting that it is “likely that the engagement strategy has been dealt a very heavy blow.” Two senior Israeli officials quickly urged the world not to engage in negotiations with Iran. Neoconservatives who had already expressed their support for an Ahmadinejad victory now have every reason to be satisfied. Opposition forces, previously on the defensive, now have a perfect opportunity to mount a political attack that will make it even more difficult for President Obama to proceed with his plan.
In their own paranoia and hunger for power, the leaders of Iran have insulted their own fellow revolutionaries who have come to have second thoughts about absolute rule and the costs of repression, and they may have alienated an entire generation of future Iranian leaders. At the same time, they have provided an invaluable gift to their worst enemies abroad.
However this turns out, it is a historic turning point in the 30-year history of Iran’s Islamic revolution. Iranians have never forgotten the external political intervention that thwarted their democratic aspirations in 1953. How will they remember this day?
Gary G. Sick American academic and analyst of Middle East affairs